cal or welfare systems' triggers, we may prevent a subsequent loss of independenceand, ultimately, the need for institutionalization.
To do this, we need a combination of better case assessment, significantly expanded supportive services, and greater development of the private market so that needed services are available to those who can pay for them. Such services might include lawn mowing, home repair, transportation, and companionship as well as the more traditional health-related services.
The care assessor must not only identify the level of disability and need, but also suggest the appropriate mix of services that might be provided through relatives or volunteers, purchased in the open market, or paid for through public and/or private funding. This early identification of needs and integration of all available services and financing mechanisms can make the system more efficient, expand available care, and help prevent problems from reaching a level at which the medical model is the only alternative.
Accomplishing this will require more than simply expanding public financing for community-based services. It will require a recognition of the vast resources, formal and informal, that are currently being used and a better understanding of how family and voluntary care can and should be integrated into the system in the future.
It will also require greater stimulation of the private market for those consumerdriven services that the "well impaired" elderly-who would not meet the disability or income criteria of a public programcould benefit from and pay for. Lastly, it will require significant strengthening of the infrastructure, which currently does not have the service capacity, the coordinating mechanisms, or the quality assurance systems to provide appropriate services efficiently and to meet the needs of this deserving population. In the Summer 1989 issue of Health Affairs, Gerard Anderson documented the rapid evolution of (South) Korea's health insurance system, claiming that the entire population was covered by insurance by April 1988 ("Universal Health Care Coverage in Korea," Health Affairs, Summer 1989). First, as a minor correction, universal health insurance was not scheduled to be in place until July 1989. In 1988, only 79 percent of the population was covered by private and public programs. 1 More important, the article neglected problems of compliance as well as important cultural and institutional characteristics of Korean society that make its health care system less similar to that found in the United States than Anderson suggested.
Mandated system. Unlike, say, the Canadian or British systems, under which there is universal coverage provided by governments and all citizens and residents are automatically covered, the Korean system is based largely on mandates that require employers to provide insurance for their employees and the self-employed to purchase insurance. This distinction is important to the ultimate success of the Korean program and similar programs that may be adopted elsewhere. Although there are fines and other penalties for failure of businesses and other employment entities to keep up with payments, it is not clear that these sanctions will be sufficient.
To see that this is not a trivial concern, one has only to consider the significant enforcement and compliance problems in the United States with respect to tax, environmental, or fair labor standards legislation. With Korea, it is too early to determine whether its mandates will be effective, especially for groups that have traditionally remained immune to tight government control.
Differences between Korea and the United States. I was also concerned about the lack of institutional and cultural context provided by the article. The health care systems of the two countries are not as similar as Anderson intimated. For example, in contrast to the United States, Korea's private profit-making hospitals account for almost 90 percent of all hospitals (77 percent of beds).
2 Consistent with the more open manifestation of profit-seeking activities, the Korean health system is characterized by minimal regulatory constraints. In many ways, and despite the mandated insurance and regulation of provider fees, it comes much closer to being a laissez-faire system than anything that has existed for decades in the United States.
There are other important, fascinating differences. First, the practice of what can be called traditional or herbal medicine has long played an important role in Korea. Herbal doctors are held in high regard, especially in rural areas. With the increase in urbanization, acceptance of modern medicine, and universal health care coverage, the future of traditional practitioners remains to be seen.
Second, the role of pharmacists in Korea has been quite different than in the United States. It also explains, in part, the relatively high expenditures on drugs (about four times the U.S. rate). Pharmacists do not need doctors' prescriptions to dispense drugs. Through the resulting opportunity to "practice medicine," pharmacists prior to 1989 were regarded as substitutes for physicians, especially by those in lower-income households or those without insurance. Whether universal health insurance will shift influence to physicians or whether Korea will restrict the practice of pharmacists in ways similar to those found in the United States will be interesting developments to observe.
Third, in Korea, private practice physicians do not typically have admitting privileges to hospitals. Hospitals have their own staff physicians. This separation, together with the minimal regulation of capital expansion in health care facilities, has encouraged private practice physicians to invest heavily in building their own clinics and facilities. This and other competitive features make the Korean system especially useful for the study of the effects of various forms of competition on efficiency, costs, and quality.
Anderson deserves credit for introducing the Korean system to Western readers, but his article leaves many relevant issues untouched. It is clear that evidence regarding the effects of mandates will become available through the Korean experience. However, the ability to generalize from this experience to other systems without careful consideration of the unique institutional, cultural, and historical characteristics of Korea may be limited. Additional work that carefully considers these characteristics can make important contributions to our understanding of both the Korean and U.S. health care systems.
Miron Stano Professor of Economics and Management Oakland University Rochester, Michigan

PPS Operating Margins: The Flip Side
To the Editor:
The analysis by Stuart Guterman, Stuart Altman, and Donald Young ("Hospitals' Financial Performance in the First Five Years of PPS," Health Affairs, Spring 1990) of Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) operating margins in juxtaposition to American Hospital Association data on overall hospital margins is a revealing exposition. However, it comes as no surprise. As annual increments in PPS payments have failed to keep pace with the rate of cost increases in the industry, it was only a matter of time until PPS operating margins reached negative territory, as they now have for rural hospitals.
What is so revealing about these data is
